Executive summary This policy brief examines the Interception of Communication Act (ICA) regulation passed by the Zimbabwean parliament in 2007. It outlines the defects of this Act, compares it to globally acceptable surveillance practices, and makes policy recommendations. A major point to note is that the ICA generally favours bulk data collection in the name of state security. . Another central point to note is that the ICA does not protect specific communities of practice that, in some democratic regimes, are excluded from surveillance for them to undertake their critical roles in society. For instance, there are no proactive mechanisms and regulations that protect important communities of practice like journalists and lawyers from surveillance. Yet, it is common knowledge that when lawyers are wantonly subjected to surveillance and communication interception, the client-attorney privilege practice is compromised, yet this constitutes the central lynchpin of the legal profession. This is equally true of journalists. They thrive on sources, and certain of their practices, like investigative journalism, depend on confidential sources and whistleblowers. Such sources are integral to journalism, especially in its execution of accountability. Zimbabwe’s ICA does not offer such protection in any of its clauses. But this is not the only concern. Several other issues make this law inadequate in its approach to communication interception. For instance, the law does not clearly define the processing of intercepted data. Every interception act should be premised on principles of transparency and fairness. Also, interception of communication should generally serve the public interest, such as fighting serious organised crime. The ICA is not fashioned for this, judging by its crucial interception mistakes. What makes this worse is the absence, within the law, of clarity on how the process of interception will