[41] The decision of the court below in denying a Cabinet Minister locus standi to claim damages for defamation is, with respect, incorrect. It does not give sufficient weight to the right to dignity and to not having one’s reputation unlawfully harmed. It elevates freedom of expression above that of dignity when there is not, and there should not be a hierarchy of rights. It denies to a class of people the ability to protect their reputations, save where defamatory statement are made with malice. [42] How then is the balance between the right to dignity and the right to freedom of expression in a democratic state to be struck when dealing with “political speech.” I consider that the proper approach to finding the appropriate balance is to recognize that, in particular circumstances, the publication of defamatory statements about a Cabinet Minister (or any member of government) may be justifiable (reasonable) in the particular circumstances and therefore not unlawful.” See the dictum of O’ Regan J in Khumalo v Hlomisa (Supra) reproduced in paragraph [6 ] above, see also PQR Bobery, in 1975 Annual Survey of South African Law. [57] I am highly persuaded by the foregoing proposition. It commends itself to me both on sound legal principles and common sense. [58] In casu, it cannot be gainsaid that the article was in the public interest in the sense that the Respondent’s paternity is directly tied to her eligibility for appointment as Acting Chief of Kontshingila. It speaks directly to her competence for appointment as such. Inspite of this public interest factor, it is however information which the public had no right to know. This is because, and as correctly found by the court a quo, the information was untruthful. It was published recklessly and negligently not caring whether it was false. In these premises, the mere fact that it was salacious to the 35