[54] It remains to consider the argument that since the Respondent is a politician and the publication was in the public interest, even if defamatory per se, it is not unlawful. [55] Let me first dispel the notion cast by the Appellants that the Respondent being a politician, and indeed a public servant in general, is deprived by virtue of her status or role in government, of the normal protection afforded to individuals by the law of defamation. What the Appellants’ proposition loses sight of, is, that though several law authorities propound this theory, they however throw a qualifier into the mix. I say this because while the law is agreed that as a matter of public policy, politicians and public officials should be more resilient to attacks on their performance as such, however, there would be justification to such publication, if only the defamatory statement is reasonable in the peculiar circumstances and therefore not unlawful. Furthermore, if the defamation relates to purely personal matters, it is actionable whether or not the Plaintiff is a politician or public officer. [56] Speaking about this subject-matter in Sankie Mthembu – Mahanyele (Supra) paragraphs [40] – [43, the court observed as follows:“[40] ---- to deny a Cabinet Minister locus standi to sue for defamation when the words complained of related to performance of work as a Cabinet Minister are, with respect, well founded. A blanket immunity for defaming Cabinet Ministers would undermine the protection of dignity. It would give the public and the media in particular, a licence to publish defamatory material unless the Plaintiff can prove malice. In elevating freedom of expression above dignity in this way the decision simply goes too far. A balance must be struck. That there is no hierarchy of the rights protected by the Constitution is affirmed by the Constitutional court in Khumalo v Holomisa. 34