to be from. Such publication is therefore defamatory per se, which eliminates considerations of an innuendo as contended.” [30] It is arguable, as contended by Adv Flynn, that the court a quo misdirected itself by placing reliance on Swazi law and custom as it did in paragraph [36] above, in arriving at its decision, when such custom has not been proved by evidence. This is arguable. However, speaking for myself, this does not detract from the finding of the court a quo that the publication is defamatory per se , as the court also placed reliance on other facts evident in the record in reaching that conclusion. The pronouncement of the court on the Swazi custom, therefore, translates to mere surplusage and is of no moment. [31] THE DEFENCES The position of the law in these circumstances, where the words are admitted and are defamatory per se, is that the court should find for the Plaintiff, except where the Defendant successfully raises some defences. Commenting on this issue in The Editor, The Times of Swaziland and Another v Albert Shabangu (Supra) at page 4, the court declared as follows: “In terms of our law, where the words complained of are admitted and they are per se defamatory, the court is justified to find in favour of the Plaintiff. However, the defendants have an array of defences, open to them. If they are successful, defendants would not be liable even though the words are per se defamatory.” [32] In casu, the Appellants raised a couple of defences which I have hereinbefore recounted in paragraph [18]. In sum they are:1. The article was in essence true. 2. It was to the benefit of the public. 20