21 SOUTHERN AFRICA PRESS FREEDOM REPORT 2019-2020 of 2009 (especially part 6, section 70-77) raise serious concerns about infringement of privacy and surveillance. access to information under the guise of national security do not meet the requisite international standards. The unclear role of Chinese telecommunication giants especially ZTE and Huawei Technologies in the Namibian telecommunications sector, acquisition of surveillance technologies, the push by the government for the roll-out of the Single Internet Gateway system and the existence of interception centres is worrisome (13). In terms of internet access, Principle 37 requires states to facilitate the rights to freedom of expression and access to information online and the means necessary to exercise these rights, by recognising that universal, equitable, affordable and meaningful access to the internet is necessary for the realisation of freedom of expression, access to information and the exercise of other human rights. Absence of judicial authorisation and transparent oversight mechanisms over the intelligence agencies and the proposed Electronic Transactions and Cybercrime Bills in absence of a data protection law also raise concerns. ASSESSMENT In response to online surveillance practices, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa states under Principle 20 (2), that States must take measures to prevent attacks on journalists and other media practitioners, including threats and unlawful surveillance undertaken by State and non-State actors. Principle 25 (3) provides that States shall not circumvent the protection of confidential sources of information or journalistic material through the conduct of communication surveillance except where such surveillance is ordered by an impartial and independent court and is subject to appropriate safeguards. Principle 41 lays down limits on state surveillance, providing that States shall only engage in targeted communication surveillance that is authorised by law, that conforms with international human rights law and standards, and that is premised on specific and reasonable suspicion that a serious crime has been or is being carried out or for any other legitimate aim, and ensure that any law authorising targeted communication surveillance provides adequate safeguards for the right to privacy. States must conform to Principle 22 (5), which provides that freedom of expression shall not be restricted on public order or national security grounds unless there is a real risk of harm to a legitimate interest and there is a close causal link between the risk of harm and the expression. Internet disruptions, policy and legislative frameworks that restrict expression and It further necessitates States to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders, adopt laws, policies and other measures to provide universal, equitable, affordable and meaningful access to the internet without discrimination. In addition, Principle 38 calls for noninterference with the right of individuals to seek, receive and impart information through any means of communication and digital technologies, through measures such as the removal, blocking or filtering of content, unless such interference is justifiable and compatible with international human rights law and standards. It stipulates that States shall not engage in or condone any disruption of access to the internet and other digital technologies for segments of the public or an entire population, and calls on States to only adopt economic measures, including taxes, levies and duties, on internet and information and communication technology service endusers that do not undermine meaningful access to the internet and that are justifiable and compatible with international human rights law and standards. references (1) See Annexure with full text of the Declaration, sourced from African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Legalinstruments (achpr.org) (2) UN General Assembly Res. 2200 A (XXI) December 16, 1966, entered into force on March 23 1976, Article 19(1) and (2) (3) Id, Article 19(3) (4) See, SDG Indicators — SDG Indicators (un.org) (5) https://ewn.co.za/2020/09/04/eswatini-govt-says-new-cybercrime-bill-won-t-limit-press-free- dom (6) https://malawi.misa.org/2020/05/03/malawi-improving-the-media-and-freedom-of-expres- sion-landscape/ (7) http://www.ipsnews.net/2020/09/mozambique-reels-from-repeated-attacks-on-press-freedom/ (8) https://zimbabwe.misa.org/2020/10/21/freedom-of-expression-environment-deterio- rates-as-tanzania-heads-for-elections/ (9) https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-tightens-noose-on-press-freedom-media-activists- stunned/a-54530614/ (10) https://rsf.org/en/news/concern-about-verbal-attacks-journalists-during-namibian-elec- tion-campaign (11) https://www.namibian.com.na/157910/archive-read/Government-prefersNBC-New-Era (12) https://netblocks.org/reports/zimbabwe-internet-disruption-limits-coverage-of-protests-7yN- V70yq (13) https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-technicians-helped-african-governments-spy-on-politi- cal-opponents-11565793017