www.misa.org in its approach and fails to distinguish between ordinary communication and protected communication, such as communication involving journalist and legal practitioner privilege. For instance, Section 61 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe defines freedom of media to include protection of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources of information. Accordingly, the bulk surveillance permitted by Section 9 of the Act is unconstitutional because it may target communications subject to journalist privilege. There is a need to amend Section 9 of the Act by abolishing bulk surveillance and supplanting it with targeted surveillance. 4.1.4. Handling of intercepted communications While the Interception of Communications Act allows for the interception of communications, does not lay down the proper procedure to be adopted when authorities examine, copy, share, sort through, use, destroy, and/or store intercepted communication 41. Accordingly, there is a lacuna in the law in that regard that needs to be addressed to put in place safeguards against the misuse and abuse of intercepted communications. 4.1.5. Notification of surveillance In Section 18 of the Interception of Communications Act, a person notified of or becomes the subject of a warrant authorising interception of their communications may note an appeal to the Administrative Court. However, the Act does not impose a positive obligation on the authorities to notify individuals that they have been the subject of an interception warrant. According to the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, Individuals should be notified of a decision authorising communications surveillance with enough time and information to enable them to appeal the decision and should have access to the materials presented in support of the application for authorisation. In the South African case of Amabhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC and Another vs Minister of Justice and Correctional Services & 10 Others Case No. 25978/17, it was held that: Pre-interception notice is self-evidently problematic. The idea is vulnerable to a cogent argument that to do so defeats the very purpose of the exercise. Thus, the focus of the application is on a post-surveillance-notice”. Accordingly, the Act should be amended to at least explicitly provide for the right of a person whose communication has been intercepted to post-surveillance-notice. 4.1.6. Public oversight In terms of Section 4A of the Interception of Communications Act as amended, it is the Cyber Security and Monitoring of Interceptions of Communications Centre, which is the sole facility through which authorised interceptions are effected. By the same token, the Cyber Security and Monitoring of Interceptions of Communications Centre oversees the enforcement of the Act to ensure that it is enforced reasonably and with due regard to fundamental human rights and freedoms. In terms of Section 4 (1) of the Act as amended, the Cyber Security and Monitoring of Interceptions of Communications Centre is established as a unit in the Office of the President. Misa Zimbabwe Policy Brief 13