2. Appointment process of POTRAZ Board members affects the Board’s independence. 2.1. Section 5(5) states that the POTRAZ Board should be independent. This independence is weakened by section 7 which leaves appointment of all of POTRAZ’s Board members to the President. Under the current arrangement there is no oversight mechanism which puts in check the President’s powers of appointment. 2.2. There is no public involvement in the selection process, a worrying development because whatever decisions the Board make potentially affect members of the public who are the main consumers of postal and telecommunications services. This is against the spirit of public participation in public affairs as espoused in section 194 of the constitution. 2.3. Recommendations: There should be an oversight mechanism on the appointment of board members. 2.4. The President should not have the sole power to appointing people to the POTRAZ Board. 2.5. Section 15(3) states that the POTRAZ Board must accept any policy directions made by the Minister in terms of section 15(1) of the Bill. This provision ensures that the POTRAZ Board has no discretion on any policy directions received from the Minister’s office. This again, compromises the board’s independence. 2.6. Recommendation: The Minister can have powers to give policy directions, but the POTRAZ should have a discretion to accept such policy directions in whole or partially, or to refuse to accept policy directions which are not in the genuine public interest.