the miscarriage of justice. In Swazila`nd Government v Aaron Ngomane (Supra) paragraph [80], I recounted this principle as follows:“In certain circumstances an appellate court may reverse a discretionary decision if it is not judicial and judicious in the sense that it exhibits a material misdirection. These circumstances have been identified by case law to include but are not limited to the following:(a) (b) (c) Where the trial court exercised its discretion wrongly in that no weight or sufficient weight was given to relevant factors. Where the decision is wrong in law or will result in injustice being done. Where the trial court:(i) acted under a mistake of law; (ii) in disregard of principles; (iii) under a misapprehension of the facts; or (iv) took into account irrelevant considerations. See Saffeidine v Commissioner of Police (1965) 1 All NLR 54, Solanke v Ajibola (1969) 1 NMLR 25.3 (d) Where there is a striking disparity between the amount that the trial court awarded and what the appellate Court considers ought to have been awarded. See Protea Assurance Company Ltd v Lambs 1971 (1) SA 530 AD at 534 – 535 A. (e) The reason or reasons given by the Judge for exercising a discretion in a particular way often provide the basis for challenging such exercise. They show what he considered and the general ground for his decision.” [63] It is to ensure a judicial exercise of this discretion that the law has evolved certain parameters as guides to the trial court in the process. [64] Adumbrating on these guiding principles in The Swaziland Government v Aaron Ngomane (Supra), I observed as follows:“ [81] This is a meet juncture for me to also indicate that the assessment of damages in non-pecuniary loss cases is a difficult and challenging task. Jurisprudence has, however, over the years endeavoured to articulate some parameters which should serve as useful guides in the award of this school of damages to ensure a judicial and judicious process. In this regard, Lord Diplock in the 37