BRIEFING PAPER: ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION IN NAMIBIA

certainly the case in Namibia. Human rights activists often claim that legal definitions
of terrorist activity are overly broad and therefore prone to being interpreted and
implemented in ways that undermine civil liberties.

‘

While it may
not have been the
intention of the legal
drafters to target
demonstrators,
journalists or
citizens expressing
themselves,
definitions in law
should be worded
with extreme care
and in a manner
that rules out the
possibility of loose
or even malicious
interpretation.

’

In terms of the definition in the 2014 Act, the scope of “any act committed by a
person with the intention of instilling terror” is very wide and hard to pin down.
For example, a media report could have a frightening effect on the public, but this
may be because the events being described in the report are frightening. If a media
report induces feelings of fear in a readership or audience could a journalist or editor
be accused of “instilling terror”? The possibility of such broad interpretations by
law enforcement officers and the courts raises the spectre of the law being abused
to persecute journalists or other members of the public who may publish or post
contentious material.
Concerns about the broadness and vagueness of the definition are also prompted
by the notion that terrorist activity includes “any act which is calculated or intended
to intimidate, instil fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution,
the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to
adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles.”
The laxity in this wording is of such magnitude that it could be interpreted as applying
to any protest or demonstration aimed at influencing government, any other body,
or the public. Robustly applying public pressure, for example through a noisy but
peaceful demonstration, for a change in policy could be interpreted as an attempt
to “force” or “induce” such a change. Even a demonstration that may turn violent
would not necessarily constitute “terrorist activity” and should be dealt with under
public order laws.
Similarly, an act that seeks to change an established position of any institution could
also conceivably be in the form of a newspaper article, radio broadcast, or Facebook
post. While it may not have been the intention of the legal drafters to target
demonstrators, journalists or citizens expressing themselves, definitions in law
should be worded with extreme care and in a manner that rules out the possibility of
loose or even malicious interpretation. All such clauses should be measured against
the Constitution to ensure they do not transgress the Bill of Rights.
The danger of anti-terrorist legislation being used to deny a fundamental right is
underlined by the law’s postulation that terrorist activity would include acts that
“disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to
create a public emergency”. This would appear to apply to many labour strikes.
Could a picket by striking workers at a public institution be understood as terrorism?
Could a blockade by taxi drivers outside a municipal office be regarded as a terrorist
activity? The wording of the definition of “terrorist activity” in the Act does make
such scenarios plausible.
Furthermore, the definition in the Act goes far beyond criminalising direct involvement
in terrorist activity. Instead it refers to “promotion, sponsoring, contribution to,
command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising,
or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit” what is earlier defined as
a “terrorist activity”.
The use of indistinct words and phrases like “promotion”, “sponsoring”,
“contribution to”, “command”, “aid”, “encouragement”, “attempt” and
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