BRIEFING PAPER: ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION IN NAMIBIA

interception and monitoring can be renewed by a judge on a three-monthly basis.
Section 44 deals with the proscription of persons and organisations. The Minister
can proscribe a person or organisation if they are involved in terrorist or proliferation
activity. However, Section 44 also sets out a number of more tenuous connections
to terrorism as being grounds for proscription, such as preparing to commit any
terrorist activity. In addition, anyone promoting or encouraging any terrorist
activity or acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or in association with persons
or organisations involved in terrorist activities or proliferation activities can be
proscribed. Perhaps most tenuously Section 44 ends by stating that any person or
organisation “in any way involved in any terrorist activity or proliferation activity”
can be proscribed. The Minister can also act on a request from a foreign state to
proscribe persons or organisations.

‘

The Prevention
and Combating of
Terrorist Activities
Act in its present
form does have
some worrying
aspects that should
be reviewed.

’

Once a person or organisation has been proscribed the Minister, according to section
45, can order the immediate freezing of any funds or assets owned or controlled by
them, even if such funds or assets are not necessarily linked to terrorism. Proscribed
persons and organisations also face travel bans in section 48. The Minister responsible
for immigration and border control must prevent the entry into or transit through
Namibia of proscribed persons and their biological or adoptive parents and children,
by issuing a travel ban.
Where appropriate, the Minister responsible for immigration and border control, on
the instruction of the Security Commission, must cause the expulsion from Namibia
of designated persons or organisations or persons or organisations working for
such persons or organisations, where such expulsion is mandatory under applicable
Security Council Resolutions.
The application of the various sections of Part 4 may be appropriate when dealing
with well-grounded suspicions of terrorist activity. However, since the various
actions and interventions outlined in Part 4 are predicated to a large extent on the
extremely broad definition of “terrorist activity” in section 1, there is a possibility
that they can be abused to target the media, civil society, opposition groups and
others.
Conclusion and recommendations
The Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation Activities Act does
not include some of the more worrying features of other anti-terrorism legislation
around the world. For example, the Act does not allow for the prolonged detention
of terrorism suspects without charge or trial; it does not feature explicit restrictions
on media reporting on terrorism related matters; nor does it explicitly restrict public
demonstrations.
It should be acknowledged that no country is immune from the threat of terrorism
and that the State, in fulfilling its duty to protect citizens, has a responsibility to
introduce effective anti-terrorism laws which comply with international standards.
However, the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation Activities Act
in its present form does have some worrying aspects that should be reviewed. This
is particularly important as the previous Bills were never adequately reviewed and
discussed in public forums or indeed by Parliament.

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