4.12.3. In their current form, the legal provisions technically empower authorized officials to direct a journalist to disclose information about a source of information used in the course of the professional duties contrary to the constitutional protection of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources of information;[54] 4.12.4. A journalist’s communications with a source of information may likewise be intercepted under the guise of detection and or investigation of crime; 5. Conclusion 5.1. The current legal and policy framework is for the surveillance and interception of communications of citizens in Zimbabwe is wide open to legal challenge on the authority of the predecessor to the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe in the case of Law Society of Zimbabwe v Minister of Transport & Anor. SC – 59 – 03; 5.2. The very persuasive judgment of the High Court of South Africa in Amabhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC & Anor. V Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and 10 Ors ( as yet unreported judgement of the Gauteng Local Division per Sutherland J and handed down on 16th September 2019) is likewise further basis for legal challenge; 5.3 It is now settled practice the world over that surveillance and interception of private communications are a necessary evil in the interests of public safety, public order, economic and other security interests; 5.4 What remains in need of further attention are the necessary safeguards to which citizens as data subjects can rely on for their protection as the lawful invasions of privacy are ongoing; 5.5 In Zimbabwe, the protection is at the tail end of the interception process i.e. to the Administrative Court but only after extensive damage may already have been done.