“[41]… pre-interception notice is self-evidently problematic. The idea is
vulnerable to a cogent argument that to do so defeats the very purpose of the
exercise. Thus, the focus of the application is on a post-surveillance-notice.
[42] This is no novel concern. In Klass v Germany ECHR [1978] 5029|71, the
European court of Human Rights recognized the unhappy need for surveillance
but nevertheless observed that one cannot undermine democracy on the grounds
of defending it. It was held at [50] that:
“The Court must be satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there
exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”
[43] In broad terms, once it is assumed that secret surveillance is capable of
justification, the controversial terrain is the risk of abuse, whether by zealous or
corrupt official. Such a risk is not academic in South Africa. The whole safeguards
model built into the statute must be examined and the presence or absence of a
right to notice means, logically that the subjects of surveillance who have
wrongfully had their privacy violated have no opportunity to initiate steps in a
court to seek relief in respect of the abuse. Thus, the right to access to the courts
as contemplated in Section 34[50] is indeed compromised… the right of notice is
critically instrumental in securing a Section 34 right. Afterall, there can be no right
without a remedy… the norm[51] is that unless reasons exist not to give notice,
notice will be given. An independent authority makes that judgment call… In the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, a post-surveillance notice
is an essential ingredient of a surveillance model that complies with Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights which guarantees privacy”
4.7.7.

It is notable that efforts are presently underway to enact an Independent
Complaints Commission in terms of a proposed Independent Complaints
Commission Bill whose stated function will be “…the provision of an effective
and independent mechanism for receiving and investigating complaints from
members of the public against misconduct by members of the security services.
Also included in the objects is the making of recommendations for disciplinary
action to be taken against offending members, securing the grant of appropriate
remedies to injured parties and the co-operation of the security services,

Select target paragraph3