6 HH 29-2007 HC 1786/06 Commissioners were disabled from dealing with and considering the application for registration. He further suggests that in the absence of any provisions in AIPPA permitting the delegation of those powers that are exercised by the Commissioners, it was felt that no such delegation could take place. The Commission therefore referred the matter to the Minister and ultimately the Commission was still waiting for directions from its parent ministry on how best to proceed. In closing, the Chairman to the Commission takes issue with the appropriateness of the nature of the relief being sought by the applicant. The Minister has also, under a separate notice of opposition, opposed the granting of relief to the applicant. The Minister denies having received the first letter addressed to him on 22 February 2006. He admits however, having received the letter of 10 March 2006. This letter only reached his office on 16 March 2006 and whilst he was still consulting with his legal practitioners on the best way to handle the matter this application was then served on him. I note that the court application was served on both respondents on 28 March 2006. The Minister accepts that due to the finding of bias made against the members of the Commission, they could not have deliberated on the application. However, he has taken the stance that despite this finding he retains confidence in them and does not wish to replace them. The Minister further avers that he finds no reason to invoke the provisions of section 40 (3) of AIPPA as, in his view, no member of the first respondent has done anything to justify such action by him. It is his view that no member of the Commission has done any act that is outside the law. It is correct, which fact is conceded by the applicant, that the existing legislation does not permit for the delegation of powers vested in the Commission to anyone else. What is however surprising is that, despite the finding by the Supreme Court in 2005 that the remarks by the Chairman of the Commission prior to the application having been heard could have created an apprehension in the minds of reasonable people that justice would not be done, no effort was made on the part of the Minister to put in place a legal structure or framework that would permit the application to be heard and determined by an impartial body. Instead of this being done, the Minister permitted a situation to prevail where those same members that had been found to be likely to be biased against the applicant, received and considered yet another application for the registration of the applicant in terms of AIPPA. The Supreme Court found that the perceived bias on the part of its chairman vitiated the proceedings by the Commission when it had considered the application from the first. For the Minister to suggest, in his opposing affidavit, that he retained confidence in the members of the first respondent and found no reason to displace them in the light of the finding by the Supreme Court would be indicative of a disinclination on his part to allow the applicant to exercise its right to 6