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SOUTHERN AFRICA PRESS FREEDOM REPORT 2019-2020

of 2009 (especially part 6, section 70-77) raise
serious concerns about infringement of privacy
and surveillance.

access to information under the guise of
national security do not meet the requisite
international standards.

The unclear role of Chinese telecommunication
giants especially ZTE and Huawei Technologies
in the Namibian telecommunications sector,
acquisition of surveillance technologies, the push
by the government for the roll-out of the Single
Internet Gateway system and the existence of
interception centres is worrisome (13).

In terms of internet access, Principle
37 requires states to facilitate the rights
to freedom of expression and access to
information online and the means necessary
to exercise these rights, by recognising
that
universal,
equitable,
affordable
and meaningful access to the internet is
necessary for the realisation of freedom of
expression, access to information and the
exercise of other human rights.

Absence
of
judicial
authorisation
and
transparent oversight mechanisms over the
intelligence agencies and the proposed Electronic
Transactions and Cybercrime Bills in absence of a
data protection law also raise concerns.

ASSESSMENT
In response to online surveillance
practices, the Declaration of Principles
on Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information in Africa states under Principle
20 (2), that States must take measures to
prevent attacks on journalists and other
media practitioners, including threats and
unlawful surveillance undertaken by State
and non-State actors. Principle 25 (3)
provides that States shall not circumvent
the protection of confidential sources of
information or journalistic material through
the conduct of communication surveillance
except where such surveillance is ordered
by an impartial and independent court and
is subject to appropriate safeguards.
Principle 41 lays down limits on state
surveillance, providing that States shall
only engage in targeted communication
surveillance that is authorised by law, that
conforms with international human rights
law and standards, and that is premised
on specific and reasonable suspicion that a
serious crime has been or is being carried
out or for any other legitimate aim, and
ensure that any law authorising targeted
communication
surveillance
provides
adequate safeguards for the right to privacy.
States must conform to Principle 22 (5),
which provides that freedom of expression
shall not be restricted on public order or
national security grounds unless there is a
real risk of harm to a legitimate interest and
there is a close causal link between the risk
of harm and the expression.
Internet disruptions, policy and legislative
frameworks that restrict expression and

It further necessitates States to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders,
adopt laws, policies and other measures to
provide universal, equitable, affordable and
meaningful access to the internet without
discrimination.
In addition, Principle 38 calls for noninterference with the right of individuals
to seek, receive and impart information
through any means of communication and
digital technologies, through measures
such as the removal, blocking or filtering
of content, unless such interference is
justifiable and compatible with international
human rights law and standards.
It stipulates that States shall not engage
in or condone any disruption of access to
the internet and other digital technologies
for segments of the public or an entire
population, and calls on States to only adopt
economic measures, including taxes, levies
and duties, on internet and information and
communication technology service endusers that do not undermine meaningful
access to the internet and that are justifiable
and compatible with international human
rights law and standards.

references
(1)

See Annexure with full text of the Declaration, sourced from African Commission on Human and

Peoples’ Rights Legalinstruments (achpr.org)
(2) UN General Assembly Res. 2200 A (XXI) December 16, 1966, entered into force on March 23
1976, Article 19(1) and (2)
(3) Id, Article 19(3)
(4) See, SDG Indicators — SDG Indicators (un.org)
(5)

https://ewn.co.za/2020/09/04/eswatini-govt-says-new-cybercrime-bill-won-t-limit-press-free-

dom
(6)

https://malawi.misa.org/2020/05/03/malawi-improving-the-media-and-freedom-of-expres-

sion-landscape/
(7) http://www.ipsnews.net/2020/09/mozambique-reels-from-repeated-attacks-on-press-freedom/
(8)

https://zimbabwe.misa.org/2020/10/21/freedom-of-expression-environment-deterio-

rates-as-tanzania-heads-for-elections/
(9)

https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-tightens-noose-on-press-freedom-media-activists-

stunned/a-54530614/
(10)

https://rsf.org/en/news/concern-about-verbal-attacks-journalists-during-namibian-elec-

tion-campaign
(11) https://www.namibian.com.na/157910/archive-read/Government-prefersNBC-New-Era
(12)

https://netblocks.org/reports/zimbabwe-internet-disruption-limits-coverage-of-protests-7yN-

V70yq
(13)

https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-technicians-helped-african-governments-spy-on-politi-

cal-opponents-11565793017

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